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                                                              Abstract 
 
The success of IMF supported programmes has conventionally been assessed by 
examining their effects on intermediate variables such as fiscal deficits, monetary 
growth and exchange rates, and final outcomes, such as the balance of payments, 
inflation and economic growth. However, little or no distinction has been made 
between those countries that implement the conditions incorporated into programmes 
and those that do not. More recently greater attention has been paid to implementation 
on the assumption that in order to work programmes need to be implemented. 
Empirical studies have begun to include political economy variables in an attempt to 
explain implementation. They have used the concept of ‘ownership’ to provide a 
theoretical framework. This paper provides an alternative conceptual framework 
based on the marginal benefits and costs of implementation. It goes on to discuss a 
range of policies that might be expected to improve implementation.    
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                                                     1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The International Monetary Fund exercises a pervasive influence over economic 
policy in many developing and emerging economies. The influence is at its greatest 
when governments turn to it for direct financial assistance. This may be forthcoming 
under different lending facilities but will be conditional on the agreement and then the 
implementation of a programme of policy reform.
1 There is a large literature 
examining the design and impact of IMF conditionality and, as one might anticipate, 
considerable debate about the extent to which Fund-backed programmes work.
2  
However, a more recent trend in the literature has been to examine the circumstances 
under which programmes are or are not implemented. 
3 
 
This concern over implementation is apposite. In order for IMF programmes to exert a 
beneficial influence over economic performance one might suppose that two 
conditions have to be met. First, they have to be well-designed. Second, they have to 
be implemented. 
4 While early research on conditionality focused on the economic 
design of programmes and their impact on intermediate policy variables and ultimate 
                                                 
1 For a summary of the Fund's facilities see IMF (2000). 
2 For reviews of this literature see, for example, Killick (1995) and ul Haque and Khan (1998). Bird 
(2001a) examines the extent to which the evidence justifies the claim made by ul Haque and Khan that 
IMF programmes on balance work. He concludes that a case may be made that they work only in a 
fairly limited way. They may strengthen the balance of payments but do not appear to have a 
significant beneficial effect on inflation and economic growth. Other factors such as the poor record on 
completion, the tendency towards IMF recidivism and the lack of a catalytic effect on other financial 
flows suggest that judged against many of their own objectives IMF programmes frequently do no 
work. 
3 See, for example, Ivanova, Mayer, Mourmouras and Anayiotas (2001). However, as the authors 
acknowledge, their study builds on earlier research directed towards explaining the success or failure of 
World Bank programmes (Dollar and Svensson, 2000). These studies are examined in some length in 
what follows. 
4 Of course if programmes are badly designed, not implementing them could be a good thing. A 
pressing question for future research is the extent to which the success of programmes in terms of final 
economic outcomes or the future evolution of policy variables such as fiscal deficits, monetary 
expansion and the real exchange rate depends on implementation. If it does, the focus of attention 
needs to be on improving the rate of implementation. If not, rather more fundamental questions may be 
asked about the design of conditionality and the rationale of IMF programmes. What is the purpose of 
conditionality if it has no significant impact on economic performance?   3
economic outcomes, there was little or no attempt to distinguish between those 
programmes that were carried through to completion and those that were not. This is a 
important shortcoming, especially when evidence suggests that a large number of 
programmes remain uncompleted (Mussa and Savastano, 2000). A logical next step is 
therefore to try and understand what factors determine the degree of implementation. 
 
Early on, the Fund attributed poor implementation to a 'lack of political will' on behalf 
of the governments concerned. But, from a policy point of view, this does not get us 
very far unless we also understand what factors determine political will. Other studies 
were therefore critical of the lack of precision and attempted to analyse why 
governments might sign an agreement but then fail to implement it (Bird, 1998, 
2002). They did this by examining the evolution of the costs and benefits involved. At 
the margin, a government may rationally discontinue a programme where the costs of 
continuing to implement it are perceived to outweigh the benefits. The costs and 
benefits will have a political dimension and implementation therefore needs to be 
viewed in the context of domestic political economy. 
 
Meanwhile, similar ideas found expression in the concept of 'ownership'. 
5Governments are more likely to implement programmes that they own, and are more 
likely to abandon programmes that they feel have been imposed upon them and which 
they have been coerced to follow by their immediate needs for external finance.  
 
However 'ownership', rather like 'political will', is difficult to measure and impossible 
to quantity with any precision. It is necessary, therefore, to look behind ownership and  
                                                 
5 For an excellent early review of the concept and dimensions of ownership see Killick (1998). More 
recent reviews include IMF (2001) and Boughton and Mourmouras (2002). Drazen (2001) presents a 
theoretical analysis of conditionality and ownership that provides rigorous support for what are in 
many ways intuitively appealing propositions. Other useful discussions of the theory behind ownership 
include Mayer and Mourmouras (2002) and Khan and Sharma (2001).   4
examine the variables that influence a government's commitment to a particular 
programme of policy reform and its ability to implement it within an evolving 
domestic political environment. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a conceptual framework within which the 
determinants of implementation may be analysed. The framework suggested differs 
from that offered elsewhere which focuses on ownership and the role of conditionality 
in constraining those opposed to economic reform. Indeed, the analysis in this paper 
suggests that there is an important distinction to be made between ownership and 
implementation. Since a policy objective is to increase the degree to which 
programmes supported by the IMF are implemented by the governments that sign up 
to them, the paper also explores the implications of the conceptual framework for 
policy. A reasonably clear agenda for reforming conditionality emerges. The paper is 
not empirical in nature and no attempt is made to formalise the analysis in a testable 
way. However, it is noted in passing that many of the findings from contemporary 
empirical studies are consistent with the predictions that emerge from the conceptual 
framework devised here. 
 
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 examines alternative ways of 
measuring implementation. It briefly investigates the record on implementation and 
assesses the extent to which the failure to implement programmes is a problem that 
policy needs to address. Section 3 briefly examines the literature on implementation, 
much of which is empirical in nature. Section 4 constructs a conceptual framework 
within which implementation may be analysed.  Section 5 builds on this framework to 
examine the implications for the design of IMF conditionality and proposes an agenda   5
of policies to improve the implementation of Fund-backed programmes. Finally, 
Section 6 offers some concluding remarks that place the proposals in the context of 
current reform within the IMF. 
 
 
2.  IMPLEMENTATION: MEASUREMENT AND RECORD 
 
 
2.1 Measuring implementation 
 
 
Measuring the implementation of IMF-backed programmes is far from 
straightforward. The most convenient and widely used measure is the proportion of 
committed resources that are disbursed, or the rate of completion (Killick, 1995, 
Mussa and Savastano, 2000, and Bird 2002). An advantage of this approach is that it 
provides continuous data. However, there are problems with it. Resources may not 
always be drawn on in spite of the fact that economic policy reform is undertaken. 
Indeed, a 'failure' to complete a programme in terms of the disbursement of resources 
may reflect economic 'success' in the sense that finance from the IMF is no longer 
required. Some programmes agreed with the Fund will be precautionary or will turn 
precautionary and in these cases there is no intention to draw resources from the 
Fund; it would therefore be inappropriate to evaluate them in terms of disbursements 
relative to commitments. In contrast, a programme may be completed in the sense of 
using all the agreed resources in spite of a government failing to fully implement all 
the conditions originally laid down. The IMF may feel that substantial progress has 
been made and may allow modest deviations from targets to be accommodated 
through the use of waivers or modifications to the initial programme. 
   6
Since the beginning of the 1990s another measure of implementation has become 
feasible as the IMF has collected data in the form of its MONA database (Monitoring 
Fund Arrangements) on the extent to which both the macroeconomic and structural 
conditions stipulated within programmes are implemented. This allows an index of 
implementation to be constructed. However, there are again problems with this 
measure; it only covers programmes that come up for review by the Executive Board 
and therefore excludes those that are cancelled permanently or interrupted. Since it 
may be assumed that it will be in these programmes that implementation is likely to 
be at its weakest, the MONA data will have an upward bias towards implementation. 
Moreover, there is only a limited amount of data as yet. 
 
Other measures of implementation focus on whether programmes are interrupted 
either reversibly or irreversibly. Reversible interruption is where a review of a 
programme is delayed, perhaps by three months in the case of stand-bys or six months 
in the case of Extended Fund Facility and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
credits, but the programme is subsequently revived. Irreversible interruption is where 
scheduled reviews are not completed or, even if they are, the instalments of the 
arrangement are not approved. This measure of implementation does not, however, 
tell us whether an interrupted programme is replaced by another one. Moreover, it 
does not provide continuous data and only allows programmes to be classified as 
uninterrupted, reversibly interrupted or irreversibly interrupted. Even so, it does 
usefully complement the implementation index based on the MONA database by 
capturing cases where programmes are interrupted and, as a result, not subject to 
further review by the Executive Board. 
   7
Although these four measures of implementation have been found to be significantly 
mutually correlated with one another (Ivanova, Mayer, Mourmouras and Anayiatos, 
2003) the correlation coefficients tend not to be very high, suggesting that the 
measures are picking up different dimensions of implementation. This needs to be 
borne in mind when comparing studies that use different measures. 
 
2.2   What is the record on implementation? 
 
Data presented by Mussa and Savastano (2000) and reproduced here as Table 1 
provide information about the completion rate of IMF programmes or the ratio of 
disbursements to commitments over the period 1973-1997. A number of features 
stand out. First, non-completion is quite widespread. Indeed, over the entire period  
covered only about 35 per cent of arrangements were fully disbursed. Second, 
whereas the completion rate was fairly stable over the period 1973-1987 at between 
40 - 45 per cent, it fell in the subsequent time period to as little as 20 per cent. Third, 
the completion rate was rather higher for stand-bys than for structural adjustment 
lending and much higher than for extended loans. 
 
Using the interruption measure, Ivanova et al (2003) report that in the period between 
1992 and 1998, 44 per cent of all programmes experienced an irreversible 
interruption, while 70 per cent experienced either a major or a minor interruption. 
They also report that the average implementation index for programmes for which 
information was available was 76 per cent, with the macro implementation index at 80 
per cent being significantly higher than the structural implementation index at 67 per 
cent. But, as noted above, these indices overstate implementation since irreversibly   8
interrupted programmes are not captured by the MONA database on which the index 
is based. Nsouli, Atoian and Mourmouras (2004) update the information provided by 
Ivanova et al (2003) to cover the period 1992-2002. Although, according to this more 
recent data, the interruption rate appears to have fallen slightly and the disbursement 
rate to have risen, the more recent sample contains more stand-by arrangements which 
tend to have fewer interruptions than EFF and PRGF programmes. In any event, and 
according to all the measures, the failure to fully implement programmes is quite 
widespread. To what extent is this a cause for concern? 
 
Implementation will be important if it is via conditionality that the beneficial 
economic effects of IMF programmes are derived. It would be difficult to justify 
conditionality and the related costs of negotiating it, if it made little difference 
whether or not it was implemented. Indeed, in these circumstances the size of the loan 
and the signal transmitted by the size of IMF lending might appear to be more 
important aspects of IMF programmes. But, if it is the announcement rather than the 
implementation of programmes that appears to have a beneficial effect on capital 
flows, it is reasonable to question whether such announcement effects reflect a belief 
that programmes will be implemented. If so, then, in the long run, positive 
announcement effects are unlikely to survive a record of poor implementation. 
 
What does the evidence say about the importance of implementation? It is mixed  
(Killick, 1995, Conway, 1994, Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskoya, 2000, Ivanova et 
al, 2003, Baqir et al, 2003, Chen and Thomas, 2003, Nsouli et al, 2004, and Dreher, 
2004). Focusing on some of the more recent studies, Nsouli, Atoian and Mourmouras 
(2004) discover that implementation exerts an independent influence over   9
macroeconomic outcomes especially over shorter time horizons. They claim that 
better implemented programmes are associated with lower inflation, and with initially 
weaker but then stronger balance of payments and fiscal outcomes. They find no 
statistically significant impact of implementation on economic growth. Chen and 
Thomas (2003) find that programmes that are stopped are associated with faster 
inflation and larger budget deficits. They also find that completed programmes exert a 
marginal positive effect on economic growth but not until three years after the 
programmes have ended. Focusing on economic growth, Dreher (2004) finds that 
IMF programmes are generally associated with reduced rates of economic growth, but 
he also finds weak evidence that compliance with conditionality mitigates this effect. 
However, it can hardly be the case that the IMF negotiates conditionality believing 
that its implementation is irrelevant. If the Fund has decided to stick with 
conditionality as a modality for encouraging economic reform, it must also concern 
itself with the implementation of conditionality and with ways of improving the 
record reported above. In order to design policy to improve implementation we 
initially need to understand the factors that influence it. A subsequent section 
therefore goes on to provide an informal conceptual framework within which the 
determinants of implementation may be identified and discussed. But first, we briefly 






3. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON IMPLEMENTATION   10
 
The literature on the implementation of IMF-supported programmes is currently quite 
sparse. Most of it attempts to identify factors that are statistically significant in large 
sample econometric exercises, although there are also case studies that attempt to 
tease out more nuanced accounts of implementation. Relatively few contributions 
analyse implementation from a theoretical perspective (exceptions include Mayer and 
Mourmouras, 2002, 2003, Drazen, 2002, and Khan and Sharma, 2001). Those that do, 
commonly adopt a game theoretic approach in which IMF conditionality is used to 
constrain or influence ‘veto players’ who are in a position to disrupt the process of 
economic reform. However, the implication is that, with powerful opposition forces 
aligned against them, governments will find it more difficult to implement reform 
than where the opposition is weak. This suggests that implementation is a political 
economy phenomenon. The empirical evidence currently available is generally 
consistent with this claim, even though there is some ambiguity concerning the way in 
which political variables will exert their influence.  
 
To date perhaps the most comprehensive single study of the implementation of IMF 
programmes has been conducted by Ivanova et al (2003). They analyse the 
implementation of 170 programmes approved between 1992 and 1998, using multiple 
measures of implementation in the form of reversible interruptions, irreversible 
interruptions, an overall index of implementation derived from the MONA database, 
and the ratio of disbursements to commitments. They econometrically test the effects 
on implementation of political conditions in the borrowing country, IMF effort, 
conditionality and initial and external conditions by using Probit and Tobit models, 
instrumenting for other variables.    11
 
They summarise their findings as follows: 'on the one hand, the implementation of 
IMF-supported programmes is strongly influenced by recipient countries' domestic 
political economy. Strong special interests, lack of political cohesion, inefficient 
bureaucracies, and ethno-linguistic divisions are strongly associated with weak 
programme implementation. The strong association between programme 
implementation and political economy variables is robust across different econometric 
specifications. On the other hand, initial economic conditions, IMF effort and the 
breadth and depth of conditionality do not seem to materially influence programme 
prospects when they are properly instrumented for.' (Ivanova et al, 2003, p4). In a 
more recent study Nsouli et al (2004) confirm the link between a country’s 
institutional and political environment and its implementation record. 
 
In stressing the overall significance of political economy variables, this research 
builds on and confirms earlier work which examined the success of World Bank 
programmes, (Dollar and Svensson, 2000). In a similar vein, and based on a study of 
major interruptions in the context of 36 ESAF programmes with the IMF, Mecagni 
(1999) discovers that they often depend on 'political disruptions serious enough to call 
into question the continuing authority of the government… the nature of political 
upheavals and the intensity of political and ethnic turmoil varied, but all cases were 
characterised by a severe reduction of the authorities' ability to commit credibly to 
and implement adjustment policies.’ (p9). Mecagni also finds some statistical 
evidence to support the suggestion that the poor implementation of programmes may 
be linked to external shocks such as export shortfalls or shortfalls in external 
financing; something also found by Killick (1995). 
   12
While all these studies share the common theme that political variables are important 
when seeking to explain implementation, there are differences between them in terms 
of the precise nature of the relationships. For example, there are differences over the 
impact of a government’s length of tenure on implementation as well as on whether a 
democratic orientation makes any difference. While Ivanova et al (2003) find no 
statistical link, in another study of IMF programme interruptions Thomas (2002) 
discovers that autocratic regimes have a better record of implementation. On the other 
hand, Joyce (2003) finds that democracy helps and that politically more open regimes 
have a superior record of implementation.  Using various measures of special interests 
within government, and unlike Ivanova et al, Joyce finds no statistically significant 
connection between them and implementation, nor does he find a link between the 
cohesion of the executive and legislative branches of government, and 
implementation. He does find that regimes that have been in power for longer are less 
likely to complete programmes, and that recently elected governments are more likely 
to complete them. His results also suggest that open economies are more likely to 
complete programmes, which he claims could suggest that proximity to the Fund's 
underlying economic paradigm is relevant. Finally he discovers that private capital 
inflows discourage implementation.  
 
There are some resonances between the findings reported by Joyce who examined 77 
programmes over the period 1975-99, and those discovered by Dreher (2003) who 
examines programme completion across 104 countries over the period 1975 -98. 
Dreher finds 'no robustly significant coefficients' when he tests for political 
explanations in terms of government fractionalisation, the political leaning of the 
chief executive's party, the existence of autonomous regions, the political power of 
the leader, the degree of political cohesion and various other political variables. He   13
does, however, find some not completely robust evidence that IMF programmes are 
more likely to be interrupted prior to elections, and that, while democratic regimes are 
generally associated with less compliance, the increase in the probability of 
interruption at election times is less severe in democracies. He also finds that initial 
economic conditions in the form of government consumption relative to GDP, short- 
term debt relative to GDP and GDP per capita exert a statistically significant effect on 
implementation. Interruptions appear to vary positively with the first two of these 
variables and negatively with the third. Ivanova et al (2003) also find some evidence 
based on bivariate correlations that implementation is affected by the severity of some 
initial conditions but, as noted earlier, this relationship loses statistical significance 
once political variables are included. Earlier research by Killick (1995) suggested that 
the degree to which programmes are completed is positively related to the amount of 
finance provided by the Fund in relation to the size of the initial current account 
deficit, although Ivanova et al do not find a similar relationship when the size of the 
loan is expressed in relation to the borrowing country's quota. 
 
In addition to the econometric research, the literature contains a number of case 
studies that have a bearing on implementation. Some of these have been conducted by 
the Fund’s Policy Development and Review Department in the context of reviewing 
IMF conditionality (IMF, 2001). Others have been undertaken by the Independent 
Evaluation Office as part of its study of the prolonged use of IMF resources (IEO, 
2002). While still others have been undertaken by outside academics; a good example 
being Stone’s analysis of the IMF’s involvement in countries in transition during the 
1990s (Stone, 2002). 
   14
While acknowledging the conventional methodological weaknesses of case studies, 
the mounting case study evidence does point to a range of factors as being potentially 
significant in explaining implementation, or the lack of it. These include: the severity 
of initial conditions, over ambition in terms of what programmes might realistically 
be expected to achieve, the gap between the policy preferences of the country’s 
authorities and the IMF, the occurrence of unanticipated shocks, and political 
economy variables such as the involvement of the political leadership, the political 
strength of those opposed to reform, political stability, the quality of the bureaucracy 
and institutions, and the stage of the electoral cycle. Political scientists have, of 
course, long recognised the importance of political variables in the process of 
economic reform (see, for example, Nelson, 1990, Haggard and Kaufman, 1992, and 
Williamson, 1993). 
 
While the empirical evidence briefly surveyed above suggests a number of influences 
on implementation, the literature has tended not to provide a conceptual framework 
within which these influences may be located. The only theoretical insight from the 
literature is that conditionality may aid implementation when there are powerful 
groups opposed to the reforms incorporated in IMF programmes. It would be helpful 




4.  A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
   15
From the viewpoint of the governments signing up to them, IMF programmes confer 
benefits and costs. At the time that they are signed the benefits will be perceived to 
outweigh the costs, but, as noted earlier, this does not mean that the programmes will 
be fully implemented. Disentangling the benefits and costs of implementation is quite 
complex. For example, is a benefit of implementation superior economic performance 
in terms of economic growth, inflation and other conventional macroeconomic 
indicators? Empirical evidence on this is unclear. So it is difficult to take this into 
account, except to note that governments cannot perhaps rely on better economic 
performance being a pay-off. In what follows we argue that, in general, governments 
have a preference not to turn to the IMF. They perceive IMF conditionality as a cost. 
That they still borrow from the IMF reveals their need for external financial 
assistance. Governments, after all, could pursue IMF-type policies outside the Fund. 
The value added from involving the Fund is the additional finance that becomes 
available both directly from the IMF and indirectly via any catalytic effect that 
operates. The additional finance will allow policies to be pursued that would have 
been infeasible without the Fund’s financial support. It will only be where 
governments need the endorsement of the Fund to pursue what would in any case 
have been their preferred policies that they will perceive conditionality as a benefit – 
or, as it is treated below, a negative cost. 
 
In the conceptual framework developed in this section, the benefit from 
implementation is therefore the continuing access to IMF and related finance that in 
turn facilitates policy options that would otherwise be unavailable. The costs are 
related to conditionality, and take the form either of sub-optimal policies as perceived 
by governments, or the loss of sovereignty over policy design. Inasmuch as   16
conditionality may be a benefit, this is covered by allowing the conditionality cost to 
be negative. With this set up, the issues associated with the implementation of IMF 
programmes may be considered in the context of a simple conceptual framework. 
 
4.1 The benefits of implementation 
 
 As illustrated in Figure 1 the benefit of negotiating a programme with the Fund is the 
additional financial resources to which it gives rise. Either these extra resources may 
be supplied directly by the Fund or they may come from the signalling effect of the 
programme and its impact on other capital flows. The value of the benefit depends on 
the availability and cost of alternative sources of finance in the absence of the Fund 
programme. Finance from the IMF becomes more valuable as the availability of 
finance from elsewhere declines. Since the first instalment of a loan from the Fund 
will be paid out at the outset of the programme, the MB schedule in Figure 1 starts 
some way up the vertical axis. The shape of MB then depends on how the marginal 
benefit of the programme varies over time and with the degree of implementation; is 
this constant or does it rise or fall, and at what rate does it rise or fall? If, for example, 
the loan is front-end loaded, and if the catalytic effect is a function of the 
announcement of the programme rather than its implementation, the MB schedule will 
have the features illustrated by MB1 in Figure 1, starting relatively high up the vertical 
axis. 
 
The relationship between the slope of MB and the size of the catalytic effect warrants 
further discussion. As noted above, the marginal benefit of a Fund programme relates 
to the extent to which it generates additional financial flows; but what is the value   17
added by or the marginal return to the IMF programme? It is possible that the MB 
schedule could decline either in circumstances where the catalytic effect is absent, or 
where it is strong but depends only on the announcement of the programme rather 
than its implementation. Where the strength of the catalytic effect depends on the 
degree of programme implementation the MB schedule will be flatter (MB2) or may 
be upward sloping (MB3). 
 
Similar arguments to these may be expressed in a slightly different way. Countries 
turn to the IMF because their balance of payments has become a binding constraint 
upon their ability to achieve other objectives. The benefit of an IMF programme is 
that this constraint is relaxed. The size of the benefit over time therefore depends on 
the extent to which the constraint is relaxed; it may be expressed in terms of the 
ability to better achieve other policy objectives. A balance of payments constraint is 
likely to be most effective in the midst of a BoP crisis when foreign exchange carries 
a high shadow price. As the crisis eases, so the BoP constraint also eases. Given this 
pattern, the marginal benefit from an IMF programme will be at its highest at the 
outset of the programme; it will gradually decline over time as balance of payments 
problems are overcome. Again the MB schedule may be expected to be downward 
sloping, and may even decline at an increasing rate, (MB4). 
 
Three other observations may be made about the MB schedule at this point. First, 
governments may sometimes worry that turning to the IMF for assistance will have an 
adverse effect on their market access because a negative signal is transmitted 
suggesting that the economy is in difficulty. The catalytic effect may be negative. A 
government that still has some access to private markets may believe that the resulting   18
reduction in capital flows will exceed the additional credit coming from the IMF. 
Although some adjustment will need to be made for the terms associated with the 
alternative types of capital, the end result may be that the government believes that 
the net result of announcing a programme with the IMF on capital inflows will be 
negative. In these circumstances the MB schedule will start at a point below the 
horizontal axis in Figure 1 (such as MB5). The benefits will be negative. Unless the 
government also believes that the implementation of the programme will nonetheless 
have a strong positive effect on private capital inflows, there would be little point in 
entering into an agreement with the Fund, since the expectation would be that the 
short run external financing constraint would be expected to become more binding as 
a result. 
 
Second, since IMF loans are disbursed in instalments, technically the MB schedule 
will decline in a stepwise fashion with the benefits falling after the receipt of each 
tranche of the loan. The benefit from further implementation then remains in part the 
option of drawing on subsequent instalments. This would of course not be the case for 
the final tranche, implying that the marginal benefit of implementation following the 
final tranche falls to zero if we abstract from the catalytic effect. This has policy 
implications to which we return when we examine replacement programmes. 
 
Third, it is important to emphasise the uncertainty surrounding the trajectory of 
economic performance. Ex post benefits from agreeing to a programme with the IMF 
may fail to match ex ante expectations. For example, at the time a programme is 
negotiated it may be expected that its implementation will have a positive effect on   19
other capital flows. If this effect is not forthcoming, or is muted, the actual MB 
schedule (MB




4.2 The costs of implementation 
 
Let us now turn to the marginal costs of an IMF programme as illustrated by the MC 
schedules in Figure 2.  The cost of an IMF programme as perceived by the 
government that negotiates it may be seen in terms of the conditionality involved. 
Governments would generally prefer unconditional financial support. It may be 
assumed that there will be a discrepancy between the policies preferred by the 
government and those preferred by the IMF; their objective functions will differ. A 
government will be aiming to stay in power and may want to protect the near-term 
standard of living as much as possible; it will be seeking to minimise the consumption 
costs of adjustment and may be concerned about the distributional effects of policies. 
The IMF, on the other hand, will be seeking to achieve near-term balance of payments 
adjustment and may be expected to emphasise macroeconomic stabilisation. In a 
sense, the balance of payments is a constraint on achieving other objectives as far as a 
government is concerned but is an objective in itself for the IMF. The Fund will tend 
to be much less concerned about the domestic political repercussions of policies. 
Either as a consequence of its own institutionally preferred economic paradigm, based 
perhaps on a scientific evaluation of the evidence, or its agency role, representing the 
interests of its principal shareholders, the IMF may prefer policies of economic 
liberalisation and openness that do not necessarily accord with governmental 
                                                 
6 Bird and Rowlands (2002) provide a review of the theory behind catalysis and an empirical 
investigation of its quantitative importance. Although on its web site the IMF claims that the catalytic 
effect is significant and a key part of its overall institutional role, studies have generally failed to find 
strong empirical evidence of its existence.   20
preferences. The bigger the gap between the policy preferences of the government and 
those of the Fund, the bigger the cost of IMF conditionality from the government’s 
view point. Since pre-conditions will have to have been implemented at the outset of 
the programme the MC schedule will also start some way up the vertical axis. The 
greater the government's reluctance to pursue these policies, the higher up the vertical 
axis the MC schedule will begin. 
7  
 
However, as noted earlier, there may be circumstances in which a government 
actually wants to pursue the policies favoured by the Fund on economic grounds but 
is concerned about domestic political opposition to them and the political costs of 
pursuing them. The government may then choose to involve the IMF as a way of 
reducing the political damage that it would encounter if it were to pursue the policies 
independently. Here the Fund is being used as a scapegoat or to tip the balance in 
favour of reform, and the costs of conditionality are negative; the MC schedule begins 
below and may remain below the horizontal axis, (MC2 in Figure 2). 
8 In other words, 
the government perceives benefits from conditionality (Vreeland, 2003). 
 
In assessing the costs of IMF conditionality two comparators exist. The first involves 
the policies that had previously been pursued within the country. These will probably 
have contributed to the economic situation in which the country is now turning to the 
Fund, and there may be expected to be a significant gap between these policies and 
                                                 
7 A countervailing point is that in the middle of a crisis and with a binding BoP constraint, whatever 
their preferences governments may be forced to prioritise policies designed to strengthen the balance of 
payments, and at the outset of IMF programmes this could reduce the marginal cost of IMF 
conditionality, shifting the vertical intercept of the MC schedule back down towards the origin. 
8 Similar negative costs of conditionality could exist where certain elements within government, such 
as the leader or the finance ministry want to tip the balance in their favour in an internal debate about 
policy. The Fund's involvement may 'strengthen the hand of reformers' thus to some parts of the 
government IMF conditionality would have a negative cost while to others it might still be perceived as 
having a more regular cost.   21
those favoured by the IMF. The second comparator is represented by the policies that 
the government would have to pursue contemporaneously if IMF assistance were to 
be unavailable. With less external financing, these would be yet more adjustment 
intensive than those favoured by the Fund. To the extent that governments turning to 
the Fund have revealed a tendency to underestimate the extent to which BoP 
constraints exist, they may also have a tendency to overestimate the costs of IMF 
conditionality in relation to the relevant comparator, which is the policies that would 
need to be pursued in the absence of the Fund.   
 
The perceived costs of conditionality may not only, however, depend on the nature of 
the policies incorporated in IMF programmes. Even where governments favour 
similar policies, they may not favour having them imposed by the Fund. In this 
respect, the cost of conditionality is the loss of sovereignty over the design of 
economic policy. Other things equal, the greater the value attached by a government 
to sovereignty the higher up the vertical axis the MC will schedule begin. 
 
The shape of the MC schedule then depends on how the costs of conditionality change 
over time and with the degree of implementation. Assuming that the sovereignty costs 
do not change, costs may fall if it becomes progressively easier to implement the later 
stages of a programme. Adjustment may have been front-end loaded. In contrast to 
this, where the policies that are least palatable to the government have been deferred 
until later in the programme the MC schedule will slope upwards, possibly at an 
increasing rate, as shown by MC3. These deferred elements are likely to be the ones to 
which there will be the greatest political resistance.  
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Just as with the benefits, the costs of implementing an IMF programme may turn out 
to be different from those that were expected at the outset. This could be because the 
economic effects are different or perhaps because political opposition to the policies 
incorporated within the programme turns out to greater or less than anticipated. As a 
consequence the actual MC schedule may have a different slope or a different 
location. However, economic shocks may be another reason why the actual MC 
schedule differs from the expected one. Over time, therefore, the MC schedule may 
shift. Economic shocks could be either negative or positive. An export shortfall 
would, for example, increase the extent to which imports need to fall in order to 
achieve a specific current account balance of payments target. Meanwhile, the related 
decline in economic growth would tend to reduce tax revenue below the expected 
level and this would imply additional cuts in government expenditure in order to meet 




4.3   Marginal benefits and costs together 
 
 
The MB and MC schedules plotted out in Figures 1 and 2 are combined in Figures 3 
and 4. Figure 3 shows that governments will embark on IMF programmes if the 
benefits in the form of the extra finance associated with the programme are perceived 
to exceed the conditionality costs.  Figures 3 and 4 also show why programmes may 
not be fully implemented. There are two possibilities. In the first case, illustrated by 
MB
1 and MC
1 in Figure 3, the government never intends to implement the programme 
fully but only up to point A where, at the margin, the costs of further implementation 
exceed the benefits. It will have promised more reform than it intended to deliver in 
order to persuade the IMF to agree to the loan. By contrast, in the second case, 
illustrated in Figure 4, the government intends to fully implement the programme at   23
its outset, only to discover that the marginal benefits are less than expected or that the 
marginal costs are greater than expected, such that it becomes rational to abort the 
programme before it is completed, as illustrated by the intersection between MB
a and 
MC
a, reflecting the actual outcome. 
 
But what happens if a government fails to fully implement the programme to which it 
has agreed; does this affect future access to IMF resources and how does this affect 
the probability that the current programme will be implemented? Where future access 
to IMF resources depends on the extent to which past programmes have been 
implemented, implementation carries with it the option value of future access to Fund 
finance. There is then an additional benefit associated with implementation and, other 
things being equal, this will increase the degree of implementation. Where future 
access does not depend on current implementation, the probability of current 
implementation will be adversely affected. Indeed, it may be quite rational for 
governments to abort current programmes if they believe that they can renegotiate 
another programme with a more advantageous configuration of benefits and costs as 
shown by the sequence of programmes in Figure 5. Here a programme will be 
abandoned by a government if it believes that the net benefits of negotiating a new 
programme exceed those of continuing to implement the existing one. 
 
From the conceptual framework developed in this section it is possible to identify a 
range of factors that are likely to influence the degree to which IMF programmes are 
implemented. The framework can also be used to analyse the notions of commitment 
and ownership that have begun to feature in the literature on implementation. Poor 
implementation has often been attributed to a lack of commitment or a lack of 
ownership. These concepts are related but are not identical. Ownership implies that   24
governments, or indeed societies as a whole, are persuaded that the policies being 
pursued within the context of an IMF programme are appropriate or even optimal. 
Leaving to one side the question of sovereignty, which may be fundamentally 
inconsistent with conditionality, the degree of ownership will be reflected by how far 
up the vertical axis the MC schedule begins. Where Fund-backed policies are deemed 
reasonably appropriate by the country (widely defined), the ownership will be strong 
and the MC schedule will begin relatively close to the origin.
9 Although it no doubt 
helps, implementation does not, however, require ownership. In the context of the 
conceptual framework developed in this section, implementation depends on the 
extent to which the marginal benefit of the programme exceeds the marginal cost. A 
government will have an incentive to implement programmes where there are large 
net benefits. This interpretation allows us to show how implementation may wane 
during the course of a programme if actual marginal benefits decline and actual 
marginal costs rise.  A similar expected net benefit from a programme will be 
associated with greater ownership where the perceived costs are lower. Figure 6 
illustrates some possible scenarios. 
Having designed a conceptual framework within which the implementation of IMF 




                               5. POLICIES TO IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION 
 
                                                 
9 Conditionality will have a diminished role where there is strong ownership although it may still retain 
a signalling function and provide a way of dealing with the time-consistency problem. As noted earlier 
conditionality may have a more powerful role where the government is a fragile coalition of disparate 
factions. Note also that conditionality will be an ineffective mechanism for overcoming time 
inconsistency and reducing the perceived chance of governments reneging on policy promises if its 
implementation is poor. For similar reasons poor implementation will weaken the signalling role of 
conditionality that underpins its supposed catalytic effect on other capital flows.   25
 
 
  The rationale behind the reform recommendations proposed here is to raise the 
benefits and reduce the costs of implementation as perceived by governments in order 
to provide a set of incentives to better encourage implementation.  The proposals are 
introduced in no particular order of importance. 
 
(i)  Take initial conditions fully into account 
 
Although there is some evidence that the Fund may already try to take initial 
conditions into account, there is enough evidence both from econometric large sample 
studies and case studies to suggest that it is not always done systematically. Targets 
are frequently over-ambitious and, as a consequence, are not achieved. The benefits 
from programmes turn out to be less than anticipated and the costs, in terms of 
adjustment, turn out to be greater. Implementation is therefore adversely affected. 
Although with more realistic targets fewer programmes might be agreed, the 
implementation of those that are should improve.  
 
(ii)  Avoid 'excessive' conditionality 
 
On the basis of the conceptual framework developed in Section 4, a broadening and 
deepening of conditionality will increase the costs of implementation. Some observers 
of the Fund suggested that with the proliferation of structural conditionality during the 
1980s and 1990s conditionality had become excessive, reducing the incentive for 
governments to comply with it (Bird, 2001 and Goldstein, 2000). Although the Fund 
denied the existence of any form of conditionality Laffer Curve (IMF, 2000) its recent 
policy of 'streamlining' conditionality suggests that it was sympathetic to the 
argument. In any case, empirical evidence produced by the Fund suggested only that 
it was the percentage of conditions fulfilled that failed to decline with increased   26
conditionality. Clearly with programmes containing more absolute numbers of 
conditions the implementation of programmes would be expected to decline in spite 
of the implementation rate staying the same. Evidence also suggests that structural 
conditions have been less well implemented than macroeconomic conditions and this 
might also suggest that a more parsimonious approach to Fund-designed structural 
conditionality would encourage better overall implementation. While the Fund might 
wish to retain the right to mandate macroeconomic constraints, it might also be 
sensible to allow governments as much discretion as possible in terms of designing 
other aspects of economic policy and in setting structural targets. A greater emphasis 
could therefore be placed on self-imposed conditionality, even though compliance 
with this could be monitored by the Fund. This is the broad direction in which the 
Fund has moved with the streamlining of conditionality. The analysis in this paper 
suggests it should increase the rate of implementation. 
 
(iii)  Shock-proof IMF programmes 
 
There is substantial evidence (although not universal) that external shocks of one type 
or another can blow programmes off course. Negative shocks raise the costs of 
complying with the conditions initially laid down. Currently the Fund seeks to deal 
with this problem by means of waivers and programme modifications or by cancelling 
one programme and replacing it with another. But this way of 'solving' the problem  
lacks transparency and has a bias towards creating an impression of failure. The 
vulnerability of economies to shocks should instead be established at the outset of 
programmes by detailed stress analysis. Shadow programmes could be agreed that 
would come into effect in the event of shocks occurring. These could involve 
additional contingency financing, for example in the case of export shortfalls, as well 
as ex ante agreements about the way in which conditionality could be modified. The   27
contingent changes in the design and financing of programmes would again be aimed 
at maintaining or indeed strengthening, the incentive for governments to continue to 
implement them by adjusting the actual costs and benefits to correspond more closely 
with those envisaged at the outset of the programme. By modifying targets in a 
contingent way, but one that is agreed ex ante, programmes could be presented as 
having been implemented rather than having failed. The stigma of failure could be 
avoided. 
 
(iv)  Provide additional finance 
 
 It should not be assumed that negotiating an IMF programme will have a catalytic 
effect on other financial flows; the evidence does not strongly support it (Bird and 
Rowlands, 2002). In the event, and in order to comply with targets, more adjustment 
is often needed than is initially assumed, and the actual costs of programmes to the 
countries concerned exceed the expected costs, thus discouraging implementation. 
Not only does the Fund need to consider ways of strengthening the link between its 
involvement and other financial flows by more effectively seeking to encourage 
private sector involvement and by putting more pressure on aid donors to deliver 
finance in support of IMF programmes, it also needs to contemplate providing more 
finance itself. This would raise the benefit as perceived by governments of both 
negotiating and then implementing programmes. The sequencing of financial support 
could also be designed to maintain an incentive to fully implement programmes. This 
proposal does not necessarily imply that the Fund's overall lending capacity would 
need to be increased; something that could encounter resistance from its shareholders. 
Instead, Fund lending could be better targeted on those countries that are likely to 
implement programmes rather than on those that are not. Moreover, if the financing 
needs of some larger emerging economies were to be in greater part met by regional   28
monetary arrangements, the Fund would be better placed financially to assist poorer 
countries where the aggregate demand for resources is lower (Bird and Rajan, 2002). 
 
 
(v)      Penalise non-implementation more heavily 
 
Although failing to comply with the conditions of a current programme reduces 
access to further instalments of that loan, it does not appear to prejudice access to 
finance under subsequent programmes (Killick, 1995). There is therefore little or no 
apparent penalty for non-compliance from this point of view. Again, the existing 
incentive structure does not encourage full implementation. Instead, and given the 
reforms suggested above to neutralise the effects of external shocks, future access to 
IMF finance could be made conditional upon achieving specific standards of 
implementation in current programmes. This would raise the marginal benefit of 
implementation by keeping open a financing option that would otherwise close. At the 
same time, and assuming that conditionality is appropriately designed, improved 
implementation should reduce the probability that the option will have to be taken up. 
In addition to making future access to Fund finance under new programmes 
dependent on past implementation, a final disbursement of contemporary programmes 
might be deferred until the programme’s conditionality has been fully implemented.                                  
 
(vi)    Be more aware of political economy factors and take them into account. 
 
This is a complex issue. However its complexity should not be used as a reason to 
ignore it. There is now a substantial body of evidence that political factors exert a 
potentially important impact on implementation; although, as noted in Section 3, the 
evidence is not entirely consistent. How should the Fund respond to the observation 
that domestic politics may affect implementation? There are two counter forces at 
work. First, the Fund does have a responsibility to try and ensure that conditions are   29
implemented; otherwise what is the point of conditionality? But second, it does not 
possess the legitimacy to become directly involved in domestic politics and needs to 
avoid political conditionality. Unavoidably, dealing with this dilemma means walking 
something of a tightrope. How can the dilemma be resolved? 
 
Empirical studies have identified a series of political variables that, in principle, may 
influence implementation. They have also identified data sources that provide, albeit 
often imperfect information on them. Just as the Fund builds up an empirical picture 
of the economic performance of countries based on key economic variables, it could 
also build up a broadly equivalent political picture relating to political stability, the 
degree of democracy, the influence of groups opposed to the incumbent government, 
electoral cycles and so on; or alternatively it could use the data set that the World 
Bank is constructing. 
10 An awareness of potential political impediments to 
implementation would allow a structured consideration of how they might be 
overcome, and this could form part of the Fund's discussions with governments, 
which would be invited to explain how they intend to deal with political constraints. 
The Fund would not be seeking to exert a direct influence over political variables, but 
would be seeking re-assurance from governments that domestic political problems 
would not terminally impair implementation. 
 
Examining data on political variables would provide historical and contemporary 
information; but what about the future? And how should the data be interpreted? The 
Fund needs to build up its capacity to address such issues, although this does not 
                                                 
10 The Database of Political Institutions. This has an expanding array of information. It includes data on 
special interests, elections, parties and ideology, although as Jim Vreeland pointed out to me the coding 
of ideology gives Jimmy Carter and Fidel Castro the same score! Other data sets include Polity and 
Freedom House which have data on democracy and autocracy. Polity allocates scores according to five 
different components such as openness of recruitment and competitiveness of elections with the 
democracy score being a sum of the five.   30
require it to have its own political analysts. Instead, it could set up a panel of country 
experts. A political risk matrix could then be constructed incorporating important 
political variables, and the country experts could be asked to quantify the significance 
of individual political risks on some form of index so that a composite political risk 
index could be constructed, as well as an index relating to each of the risk factors in 
isolation. The indexes could then form the basis for the Fund's discussions with the 
government in terms of the politics of implementation. There would also be a key role 
for the Fund's country representatives to play in commenting on the political risk 
index. 
 
Clearly there would be an element of subjectivity and uncertainty in all of this but, by 
soliciting a number of independent opinions and by observing the variance around the 
mean index score, it would be possible to provide an indication of the degree of 
uncertainty pertaining to political risks. 
 
Where a programme had been agreed with a government, and where the government 
believed it to be helpful, the Fund could also fulfil the role of 'honest broker' in terms 
of helping to explain publicly why a particular programme had been adopted and 
others rejected.   
 
(vii)     Introduce greater flexibility into programme design. 
 
A structured discussion of the domestic politics of economic reform might encourage 
governments to think more clearly about how potential impediments could be 
overcome, but it might also lead the Fund to modify the design of its preferred 
programme. Is it better to push for a programme that, while perceived by the Fund as 
optimal in an economic sense, has little or no chance of being implemented given the   31
political realities, or one that, while sub-optimal in terms of economic design, has a 
higher probability of being implemented? This might appear to be a 'no brainer' where 
the costs of the compromises on economic design are small and the gains in terms of 
the probability of implementation are large. But, in practice, the trade-off is likely to 
be much less straightforward. At the same time, ignoring it means that a decision in 
favour of 'optimal' economic design is in effect being made. 
 
One possibility would be to move away from the current system under which 
countries need to comply with all the performance criteria contained in a programme 
in order to be eligible to continue to draw resources - unless waivers are granted or the 
programme is modified. Instead, governments could be given the option of receiving a 
proportion of the finance in return for complying with a proportion of the 
conditionality. Again, such a system would emphasise the positive - what has been 
achieved - rather than the negative - what hasn't. Governments would be offered a 
wider choice of policy options in terms of a range of financing and reform 
combinations. Conditions that the Fund regarded as non-negotiable would be 
mandatory. Others could be ranked as strongly recommended or recommended, with 
the amount of finance associated with implementing them modified accordingly. 
 
Additional flexibility could be introduced by allowing more time to implement 
conditions. Rather than setting a specific time by which a reform would have to be 
implemented, the arrangement with the Fund would link the timing of disbursements 
to the timing of implemented reform. There would be ‘floating tranches’. This would 
be preferable to cancelling one programme and negotiating a replacement one since 
again it would help to avoid the psychology of failure, and could reduce negotiating 
costs.   32
 
 
(viii)     Undertake more systematic ex post evaluation of programmes 
 
At present, the ex post assessment of programmes within the Fund appears to be 
somewhat ad hoc and perfunctory (IEO, 2002). Hard lessons about why programmes 
were discontinued may not have been learned as well as they might have been, with 
the result that mistakes are repeated. The legacy may be the prolonged use of IMF 
resources amongst some countries and a sequence of failing programmes. Instead, the 
Fund could aim to construct a systematic bank of information as to why some 
programmes are not implemented and others are. As a template this could use the 
ideas discussed above in terms of the potential sources of poor implementation. The 
information could then be used more effectively to evaluate the design of future 
programmes. 
 
(ix)    Other institutional reforms within the IMF 
 
At present within the Fund there is a relatively high degree of mobility amongst the 
personnel who lead missions to specific countries; turnover is rapid. Countries 
sometimes complain about the resultant lack of continuity. Just when someone 
understood the economic and political circumstances, a new mission chief arrives and 
the whole process starts over again. Care needs to be exercised in assessing the 
importance of such factors since there are other ways in which information may be 
shared, and turnover may have significant advantages such as avoiding inertia. 
However, it may not be unreasonable to suggest that greater continuity might be 
sought where a record of good implementation has been established. Similarly, the 
Fund could review its in-house training of mission personnel and provide the 
opportunity for mission chiefs with a successful record in relation to programme   33
implementation to share their views with others. In addition to this, the training of 
mission personnel could usefully draw on the expanding literature relating to 
negotiation. The Fund should not be satisfied by just designing what it perceives as 
appropriate policies; it should also think more seriously about the art of persuasion 
and negotiation. 'Getting to yes' should be of concern to any negotiator. Improving 
negotiation techniques could affect the recipient governments’ commitment to 
programmes and therefore the chances of implementation. It is easy to disregard the 
importance of negotiation. Economists perhaps tend to be excessively academically 
parochial and to pay insufficient attention to what they can learn from other 
disciplines. As noted earlier, improving the implementation of programmes may 
depend in part on showing an increased awareness of politics. But it may also require 
IMF missions to be more aware of the psychology of negotiation. In the context of the 
conceptual framework outlined in Section 4, the objective would be to influence 
governments’ perceptions of the benefits and costs of programmes in such a way as to 
raise the perceived net benefits and thereby increase the probability of 
implementation. 
 
But why should mission personnel care whether the programmes they have negotiated 
are implemented? Is their career progression within the Fund influenced by it? At 
present, it would seem not. It is more important to get an arrangement than it is for it 
to be implemented. The implication may be that at the same time as the incentives for 
countries to comply are being examined, the incentives for Fund staff to concern 
themselves with implementation should also be reviewed. 
 
(x)     Greater selectivity 
   34
By seeking to increase the benefits and reduce the costs of programmes, the Fund may 
endeavour to create a set of incentives that encourages implementation. However, 
there will remain cases where the Fund assesses the probability of even fairly partial 
implementation as being low. The discussion in (viii) above suggests that in such 
circumstances the Fund could opt for a truncated programme that is limited to prior 
actions and perhaps one consequent instalment of money. Essentially the Fund could 
be more selective and only endorse programmes in which there was a reasonable 
chance of implementation. Of course this begs its own questions. For example, what 
chance is 'reasonable'? What have to be the odds on implementation before the Fund 
will refuse to make an arrangement? Moreover, the chance of implementation is not 
something that can be objectively measured. Given the IMF’s organisational structure 
it is likely that it would choose to err on the side of leniency and on giving the benefit 
of doubt to a government which commits itself to reform. However, in circumstances 
where countries have a track record of non-compliance the Fund needs to be able to 
exercise a credible threat to withhold future resources if it wants to stand a chance of 
strengthening the incentives that countries face to comply with conditions. At present, 
the perception that failing to implement a programme carries little penalty can do little 
other than disincentivise governments from completing them. However, alongside 
wielding a more effective 'stick', the Fund also needs of offer more 'carrots' to those 
countries that make sincere efforts to carry programmes through to completion. The 
policy of being more selective and being prepared to say ‘no’ should therefore be 
pursued in conjunction with policies designed to maximise the ability to say ‘yes’ in 
the belief that the resulting programmes will be implemented. 
 
The danger is that a policy of greater selectivity could be taken too far. Clearly, in a 
sense, the problem of poor implementation could be resolved by shifting entirely to ex   35
ante conditionality. There are at least two problems with this as a way of dealing with 
poor implementation. First, it is in conflict with the basic rationale of the Fund that is 
to provide financing to enable countries to cushion the process of adjustment. This is 
not to argue that there is no legitimate role for prior actions or pre conditions, but 
rather that they should not be relied on exclusively. Second, limited as it is, the 
evidence suggests that where prior actions have been used more intensively, perhaps 
in the circumstances of a replacement programme, they have not improved overall 
implementation, as measured by the incidence of irreversible breakdown (Thomas, 
2002). 
 




Attention has only fairly recently begun to be paid to the implementation of IMF 
programmes. Early studies of the effects of programmes did not distinguish between 
those that were implemented and those that were not. However, it has gradually been 
recognised that the failure of programmes could be more to do with poor 
implementation than intrinsically poor economic design. Having acknowledged its 
importance, the Fund tended to attribute poor implementation to a lack of 'political 
will' on the part of governments. Rather than simply cajoling them to do better, the 
rhetoric and reality of IMF programmes has been modified. Conditionality has been 
'streamlined' and commitment and 'political will' has been repackaged as 'ownership'. 
Countries are more likely to implement programmes that they 'own'. The Fund's 
approach to 'ownership' has been to seek to involve more sections of society in the 
process of agreeing to the design of a programme of reform; and thereby to secure a 
firmer national endorsement of it. 
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Is this the right approach? Surely it sounds reasonable. But what if having consulted 
more widely, similar programmes are then put in place? Will this not exacerbate 
feelings of alienation? In any case, is it legitimate for the Fund to consult and perhaps 
ultimately negotiate with sections of society outside the government? Furthermore it 
is intrinsically difficult to operationalise the concept of ownership. 
 
The argument in this paper suggests that emphasising ownership may be relatively 
unhelpful. Instead this paper focuses on implementation, viewing it as a positive 
function of its marginal benefits and a negative function of its marginal costs. This 
approach offers a more clearly defined reform agenda. To enhance implementation it 
is necessary to identify what the costs and benefits are, and then seek to modify them 
accordingly. Implementation may be improved by increasing the perceived benefits 
and reducing the perceived costs. However, while there is a simple conceptual 
framework, the importance of individual factors affecting benefits and costs will vary 
from case to case, making it unlikely that we can expect to formulate a specific model 
that will accurately explain implementation across the board. Individual cases will 
differ from one another. For example domestic politics may be important in some 
cases but not in others where perhaps vulnerability to external shocks may be more 
important. 
 
The policy implication is that the Fund needs to be aware of the range of factors that 
may, in principle, influence implementation. It then needs to take them into account as 
necessary when programmes are being negotiated. This means that the nature of 
programmes and the way in which they are set up will vary in accordance with the 
factors that are pertinent. 
   37
It is by developing a greater understanding of the various dimensions of the political 
economy of implementation and by modifying programmes in the light of them that 
the record on implementation may be improved. This implies a multi-faceted 
approach to implementation. Streamlining conditionality and talking about ownership 
may represent moves in the right direction and a willingness to contemplate measures 
that are designed to improve implementation, but they may not lead to a significant 
change unless a more fully thought out approach is adopted which focuses on the set 
of incentives - both positive and negative - that confront governments and the IMF.  38
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Table 1.     Fraction of IMF loan actually disbursed under each arrangement, 
distribution by quartiles 
 
 

































































































































































Source: Mussa and Savastano (2000) 
 
 
1/ Calculated as the ratio of the total purchases made to the full amount of IMF resources committed 
under each arrangement. 
 
2/ Includes stand-by arrangements, EFF arrangements, and arrangements under the SAF and ESAF.  
Excludes STF arrangements, and drawings under the first credit tranche and the CCFF. 
 
3/ The distribution of the ratio x for the 1993-97 period is biased (downward) by the inclusion of 
arrangements with expiration date posterior to 1997.  This bias is also present in the distributions 
reported for the full period.  42
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I – start of first programme
II – scheduled end of first programme
III – first programme cancelled since actual costs exceed actual benefits at the margin.













(1) MB1 / MC1: reasonably strong ownership and commitment
(2) MB2 / MC2: weaker ownership but stronger commitment
(3) MB2 / MC1: similar ownership to (1) above but stronger commitment
Scheduled
End of
programme
 
 